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Summary
November 13, 2001, President Bush issued a Military Order (M.O.) pertaining
to the detention, treatment, and trial of certain non-citizens in the war against
terrorism. Military commissions pursuant to the M.O. began in November, 2004,
against four persons declared eligible for trial, but proceedings were suspended after
a federal district court found one of the defendants could not be tried under the rules
established by the Department of Defense.  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed that decision, Rumsfeld v. Hamdan, which will allow the military tribunals
to resume.
The M.O. has been the focus of intense debate both at home and abroad.  Critics
argued that the tribunals could violate the rights of the accused under the Constitution
as well as international law, thereby undercutting the legitimacy of any verdicts
rendered by the tribunals.  The Administration responded by publishing a series of
military orders and instructions clarifying some of the details.  The procedural
aspects of the trials are to be controlled by Military Commission Order No. 1
(“M.C.O. No. 1”). The Department of Defense also released two more orders and
nine “Military Commission Instructions,” which set forth the elements of some
crimes that may be tried, establish guidelines for civilian attorneys, and provide other
administrative guidance.  These rules were praised as a significant improvement over
what might have been permitted under the M.O., but some argue that the
enhancements do not go far enough.
This report provides a background and analysis comparing military commissions
as envisioned under M.C.O. No. 1 to general military courts-martial conducted under
the UCMJ.  The report notes some of the criticism directed at the President’s M.O.,
and explains how those concerns are addressed by the military commission orders
and instructions.  A summary of the Hamdan case follows, as well as an overview of
relevant legislation (H.R. 3044 and H.R. 3038).  Finally, the report provides two
charts to compare the regulations issued by the Department of Defense to standard
procedures for general courts-martial under the Manual for Courts-Martial and to
proposed legislation.  The second chart, which compares procedural safeguards
incorporated in the regulations with established procedures in courts-martial, follows
the same order and format used in CRS Report RL31262, Selected Procedural
Safeguards in Federal, Military, and International Courts, in order to facilitate
comparison with safeguards provided in federal court and the International Criminal
Court.
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1 Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). For a summary of Rasul and related cases, see CRS
Report RS21884, The Supreme Court and Detainees in the War on Terrorism: Summary and
Analysis of Recent Decisions.
2  Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism
§1(a), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001) (hereinafter “M.O.”).
3 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.Supp.2d 152 (D.D.C.,2004), rev’d  _ F3d _ (D.C. Cir. 2005).
4  Department of Defense (“DoD”) documents related to military commissions are available
online at [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/commissions.html] (last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
5 Reprinted at 41 I.L.M. 725 (2002).
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Introduction
Rasul v. Bush, issued by the U.S. Supreme Court at the end of its 2003 - 2004
term, clarified that U.S. courts do have jurisdiction to hear petitions for habeas
corpus on behalf the approximately 550 persons detained at the U.S. Naval Station
in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in connection with the war against terrorism.1  It appears
that federal courts will play a role in determining whether the military commissions,
established  pursuant to President Bush’s Military Order (M.O.) of November 13,
2001,2 are valid under U.S. constitutional and statutory law, and possibly under
international law.  More than a dozen petitions for habeas corpus are pending before
the federal District Court for the District of Columbia.  In one case, a federal judge
ruled that a detainee is entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war until a competent
tribunal has decided otherwise, and may not be tried by a military commission as
currently constituted under the Administration’s regulations.3  The D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed, however, allowing the military tribunals, which had been
temporarily suspended during the appeal process, to resume against four detainees.
The Department of Defense (DoD) in 2003 released eight “Military Commission
Instructions” (“M.C.I. No. 1-8”)4 to elaborate on the set of procedural rules to govern
military tribunals.  Those rules are set forth in Military Commission Order No. 1
(“M.C.O. No. 1”), issued in March, 2002.5  The instructions set forth the elements
of some crimes that may be tried by military commission, establish guidelines for
civilian attorneys, and provide other administrative guidance and procedures for
military commissions.  Additionally,  Major General John D. Altenburg, Jr. (retired),
CRS-2
6 See Press Release, Department of Defense, President Determines Enemy Combatants
Subjec t  to  His  Mi l i ta ry Order  ( Ju ly 3 ,  2003) ,  avai lable  a t
[http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2003/nr20030703-0173.html] (last visited Aug. 1,
2005). According to the Defense Department, that determination is effectively “a grant of
[military] jurisdiction over the person.” See John Mintz, 6 Could Be Facing Military
Tribunals, WASH. POST July 4, 2003, at A1.  Subsequently, nine additional detainees were
determined to be eligible.  See Press Release, Department of Defense, Presidential Military
Order Applied to Nine more Combatants (July 7, 2004), available at
[http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040707-0987.html] (last visited Aug. 1,
2005).
7 See John Mintz and Glenn Frankel, 2 Britons, Australian Among Six Facing Trial, WASH.
POST, July 5, 2003, at A13.  
8 See Press Releases, Department of Defense, Statements on Detainee Meetings (July 23,
2 0 0 3 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  a t  [ h t t p : / / w w w . d e f e n s e l i n k . mi l / n e w s / Aug2 0 0 4 /
commissions_releases.html] (last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
9 See Press Release, Department of Defense, U.S. and Australia Announce Agreements on
G u a n t a n a m o  D e t a i n e e s  ( N o v .  2 5 ,  2 0 0 3 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  a t
[http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2003/nr20031125-0702.html](last visited Aug. 1,
2005). 
10 See Ed Johnson, British Guantanamo Detainees to Be Freed, AP, Jan. 11, 2005.
11 See Press Release, Department of Defense, Guantanamo Detainee Charged (June 10,
2004), available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040610-0893.html](last
visited Aug. 1, 2005). 
12 Press Release, Department of Defense, Two Guantanamo Detainees Charged (Feb. 24,
2004), available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040224-0363.html](last
visited Aug. 1, 2005).  The two defendants are charged with “willfully and knowingly
joining an enterprise of persons who shared a common criminal purpose and conspired with
Osama bin Laden and others to commit the following offenses: attacking civilians; attacking
(continued...)
the Appointing Authority for the commissions, has issued several Appointing
Authority Regulations, governing disclosure of communications, interlocutory
motions, and professional responsibility. 
President Bush has determined that fifteen of the detainees at the U.S. Naval
Station in Guantánamo Bay are subject to the M.O. and may consequently be charged
and tried before military commissions.6 Six detainees declared eligible in 2003
included two citizens of the U.K. and one Australian citizen.7  After holding
discussions with the British and Australian governments regarding the trial of their
citizens, the Administration  agreed that none of those three detainees will be subject
to the death penalty.8  The Administration has agreed to modify some of the rules
with respect to trials of Australian detainees,9 but has agreed to return the U.K.
citizens, including two who had been declared eligible for trial by military
commission, to Great Britain.10  The Administration agreed to return one Australian
citizen, but another, David Hicks has been charged with conspiracy to commit war
crimes; attempted murder by an unprivileged belligerent and aiding the enemy.11  One
citizen from Yemen and one from the Sudan were formally charged with conspiracy
to commit certain violations of the law of war (and other crimes triable by military
commission).12  Salim Ahmed Hamdan of Yemen is accused of providing physical
CRS-3
12 (...continued)
civilian objects; murder by an unprivileged belligerent; destruction of property by an
unprivileged belligerent; and terrorism.”  One of the detainees filed for a writ of prohibition
and writ of mandamus with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) in an
effort to halt the military commission proceedings, [http://www.nimj.org/documents/al-
Qosi_.pdf] (last visited Aug. 1, 2005), but the CAAF dismissed the petition without
prejudice in January, 2005.
13 Press Release, Department of Defense, Additional Military Commission Charges Referred
(July 14, 2004), available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/
nr20040714-1030.html](last visited Aug. 1, 2005).  
14 See Letter from Timothy H. Edgar, ACLU Legislative Counsel, Military Commission
Order No. 1, March 21, 2002  (April  16, 2002), available at
[http://www.aclu.org/NationalSecurity/NationalSecurity.cfm?ID=10150&c=111] (last
visited Aug. 1, 2005); American College of Trial Lawyers, Report on Military Commissions
for the Trial of Terrorists, March 2003 [hereinafter “ACTL”], available at
[http://www.actl.com/PDFs/MilitaryCommissions.pdf](last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
15 The president of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL)
announced that NACDL “cannot advise its members to act as civilian counsel” because it
deems the rules too restrictive to allow for zealous and professional representation on their
part. See Lawrence Goldman, Guantanamo: Little Hope for Zealous Advocacy, NACDL
CHAMPION, July 2003, at 4, available at [http://www.nacdl.org]  (last visited Aug. 14,
2003).
16 The Administration has not explicitly used this authority; instead, it says the prisoners are
being held as “enemy combatants” pursuant to the law of war.
17 See Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Defense Department Issues Order on Military Commissions, 18
No. 5 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP 215 (2002) (citing comments by DoD chief counsel
(continued...)
security for Osama bin Laden and other high ranking Al Qaeda members and was
charged with conspiracy to attack civilians, murder by an unprivileged belligerent
and terrorism.13
The M.O. has been the focus of intense debate both at home and abroad.  Critics
argue that the tribunals could violate the rights of the accused under the Constitution
as well as international law, thereby undercutting the legitimacy of any verdicts
rendered by the tribunals. The Administration initially responded that the M.O.
provided only the minimum requirements for a full and fair trial, and that the
Secretary of Defense intended to establish rules prescribing detailed procedural
safeguards for tribunals established pursuant to the M.O.  The procedural rules
released in March 2002 were praised as a significant improvement over what might
have been permitted under the language of the M.O., but some have continued to
argue that the enhancements do not go far enough, and that the checks and balances
of a separate rule-making authority and an independent appellate process are
necessary.14  The release of the Military Commission Instructions sparked renewed
debate, especially concerning the restrictions on civilian attorneys,15 resulting in
further modifications to the rules.  Critics have noted that the rules do not address the
issue of indefinite detention without charge, as appears to be possible under the
original M.O.,16 or that the Department of Defense may continue to detain persons
who have been cleared by a military commission.17  The Pentagon has stated that its
CRS-4
17 (...continued)
William J. Haynes II to a New York Times reporter).  
18 See Neil A. Lewis, Two Prosecutors Faulted Trials For Detainees, NY TIMES, August 1,
2005, at A1.
19 See CRS Report RL31191, Terrorism and the Law of War: Trying Terrorists as War
Criminals before Military Commissions (providing a general background of U.S. history of
military commissions).
20  10 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.
21  See 10 U.S.C. § 818; 18 U.S.C. §2441. 
22  See U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, section 505(e)
[hereinafter “FM 27-10”].
23 See WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 841-42 (2d ed. 1920)(noting
that “in the absence of any statute or regulation,” the same principles and procedures
commonly govern, though possibly more “liberally construed and applied”); David Glazier,
Note, Kangaroo Court or Competent Tribunal?: Judging the 21st Century Military
Commission, 89 VA. L. REV. 2005 (2003).
24 See Kevin J. Barry, Military Commissions: American Justice on Trial,  FED LAW., July
2003, at 24.
Inspector General (IG) looked into allegations, made by military lawyers assigned as
prosecutors to the military commissions, that the proceedings are rigged to obtain
convictions, but the IG did not substantiate the charges.18
Military Commissions are courts usually set up by military commanders in the
field to try persons accused of certain offenses during war.19  They are distinct from
military courts-martial, which are panels set up to try U.S. service members (and
during declared wars, civilians accompanying the armed forces) under procedures
prescribed by Congress in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).20  U.S.
service members charged with a war crime are normally tried before courts-martial,
but may also be tried by military commission or in federal court, depending on the
nature of the crime charged.21  All three options are also available to try certain other
persons for war crimes.  Federal and state criminal statutes and courts are available
to prosecute specific criminal acts related to terrorism that may or may not be triable
by military commission.   
Military commissions trying enemy belligerents for war crimes directly apply
the international law of war, without recourse to domestic criminal statutes, unless
such statutes are declaratory of international law.22  Historically, military
commissions have applied the same set of procedural rules that applied in courts-
martial.23  Some critics of the current plan to use military commissions believe the
rules are modeled more closely after the military commissions held during World
War II than today’s courts-martial.24  
M.C.O. No. 1 sets forth procedural rules for the establishment and operation of
military commissions convened pursuant to the November 13, 2001, M.O.  It
addresses the jurisdiction and structure of the commissions, prescribes trial
procedures, including standards for admissibility of evidence and procedural
CRS-5
25 M.C.I. No. 1 at § 4.C.
26 M.C.I. No. 1 lists 10 U.S.C. § 898 as a reference.  That law, Article 98, UCMJ,
Noncompliance with procedural rules, provides:
Any person subject to this chapter who - 
(1) is responsible for unnecessary delay in the disposition of any case of a person accused
of an offense under this chapter; or 
(2) knowingly and intentionally fails to enforce or comply with any provision of this
chapter regulating the proceedings before, during, or after trial of an accused; 
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct 
27  P.L. 107-40.
28 M.O. § 1(e) (finding such tribunals necessary to protect the United States and for effective
conduct of military operations).
safeguards for the accused, and establishes a review process.  It contains various
mechanisms for safeguarding sensitive government information.  M.C.O.  No. 3,
“Special Administrative Measures for Certain Communications Subject to
Monitoring,” establishes procedures for authorizing and controlling the monitoring
of communications between detainees and their defense counsel for security or
intelligence-gathering purposes.  M.C.O. No. 2 and 4 designate appointing officials.
M.C.I. No. 1 provides guidance for interpretation of the instructions as well as
for issuing new instructions.  It states that the eight M.C.I. apply to all DoD personnel
as well as prosecuting attorneys assigned by the Justice Department and all civilian
attorneys who have been qualified as members of the pool.  Failure on the part of any
of these participants to comply with any instructions or other regulations “may be
subject to the appropriate action by the Appointing Authority, the General Counsel
of the Department of Defense, or the Presiding Officer of a military commission.”25
“Appropriate action” is not further defined, nor is any statutory authority cited for the
power.26 M.C.I. No. 1 also reiterates that none of the instructions is to be construed
as creating any enforceable right or privilege.
Jurisdiction
The President’s M.O. has been criticized as overly broad in its assertion of
jurisdiction, because it could be interpreted to cover non-citizens who have no
connection with Al Qaeda or the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  It has been
argued that the constitutional and statutory authority of the President to establish
military tribunals does not extend any further than Congress’ authorization to use
armed force in response to the attacks.27  Under a literal interpretation of the M.O.,
however, the President may designate as subject to the order any non-citizen he
believes has ever engaged in any activity related to international terrorism, no matter
when or where these acts took place.  A person subject to the M.O. may be detained
and possibly tried by military tribunal for violations of the law of war and “other
applicable law.”28
M.C.O. No. 1 does not explicitly limit its coverage to the scope of the
authorization of force, but it clarifies somewhat the ambiguity with respect to the
offenses covered. M.C.O. No. 1 establishes that commissions may be convened to
try aliens who are designated by the President as subject to the M.O., whether
CRS-6
29  10 U.S.C. § 821.
30  10 U.S.C. §§ 904 and 906, respectively. The circumstances under which civilians accused
of aiding the enemy may be tried by military tribunal have not been decided, but a court
interpreting the article may limit its application to conduct committed in territory under
martial law or military government, within a zone of military operations or area of invasion,
or within areas subject to military jurisdiction.  See FM 27-10, supra note 22, at
para. 79(b)(noting that treason and espionage laws are available for incidents occurring
outside of these areas, but are triable in civil courts). Spying is not technically a violation
of the law of war, however, but violates domestic law and traditionally may be tried by
military commission. See id. at para. 77 (explaining that spies are not punished as “violators
of the law of war, but to render that method of obtaining information as dangerous, difficult,
and ineffective as possible”).  
31 See, e.g., United States v. Schultz, 4 C.M.R. 104, 114 (1952)(listing as crimes punishable
under the law of war, in occupied territory as  murder, manslaughter, robbery, rape, larceny,
arson, maiming, assaults, burglary, and forgery). 
32 See WINTHROP, supra note 23, at 836.
33 See id. (citing Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866)).   Winthrop notes that the
limitations as to place, time, and subjects were not always strictly followed, mentioning a
Civil War case in which seven persons who had conspired to seize a U.S. merchant vessel
at Panama were captured and transported to San Francisco for trial by military commission.
Id. at 837 (citing the pre-Milligan case of T.E. Hogg).
captured overseas or on U.S. territory, for violations of the law of war and “all other
offenses triable by military commissions.”  While this language is somewhat
narrower than “other applicable law,” it remains vague.  However, the statutory
language recognizing the jurisdiction of military commissions is similarly vague,
such that the M.C.O. does not appear on its face to exceed the statute with respect to
jurisdiction over offenses.  It does not resolve the issue of whether the President may,
consistent with the Constitution, direct that criminal statutes defined by Congress to
be dealt with in federal court be redefined as “war crimes” to be tried by the military.
By statute, military tribunals may be used to try “offenders or offenses
designated by statute or the law of war.”29  There are only two statutory offenses for
which convening a military commission is explicitly recognized: aiding the enemy
and spying (in time of war).30  It appears that “offenses designated by the law of war”
are not necessarily synonymous with “offenses against the law of war.”  Military
tribunals may also be used to try civilians in occupied territory for ordinary crimes.31
During a war, they may also be used to try civilians for committing belligerent acts,
even those for which lawful belligerents would be entitled to immunity under the law
of war, but only where martial law or military government may legally be exercised
or on the battlefield,32 where civilian courts are closed.33 Such acts are not necessarily
offenses against the law of war (that is, they do not amount to an international war
crime), but are merely unprivileged under it, although courts and commentators have
tended to use the terms interchangeably.  
Some argue that civilians, including unprivileged combatants unaffiliated with
a state (or other entity with “international personality” necessary for hostilities to
amount to an “armed conflict”), are not directly subject to the international law of
CRS-7
34 See Leila Nadya Sadat, Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L.
REV. 135 (2004)(arguing that no armed conflict exists with respect to terrorists, making the
law of war inapplicable to them).
35  The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War [hereinafter
“GPW”] art. 102 states:
A prisoner of war can be validly sentenced only if the sentence has been pronounced by
the same courts according to the same procedure as in the case of members of the armed
forces of the Detaining Power, and if, furthermore, the provisions of the present Chapter
have been observed. 
 6 U.S.T. 3317.  The Supreme Court finding to the contrary in In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1
(1946), is likely superceded by the 1949 Geneva Convention.  For more information about
the treatment of prisoners of war, see CRS Report RL31367, Treatment of  “Battlefield
Detainees” in the War on Terrorism.
36 See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, ANNOTATED GUIDE: PROCEDURES FOR
TRIALS BU MILITARY COMMISSIONS OF CERTAIN NON-UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN THE WAR
AGAINST TERRORISM 10-11 (hereinafter “NIMJ”)(noting that civilians in occupied Germany
after World War II were sometimes tried by military commission for ordinary crimes
unrelated to the laws of war).  Military trials of civilians for crimes unrelated to the law of
war on U.S. territory under martial law are permissible only when the courts are not
functioning.  See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1945).
37 327 U.S. at 17 (“Obviously charges of violations of the law of war triable before a military
tribunal need not be stated with the precision of a common law indictment.”).  
38 See Philip A. Gagner, The Bush Administration’s Claim That Even Citizens Can Be
Brought Before Military Tribunals, and Why it Should Never Be Put into Practice, available
at [http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20011226_gagner.html] (last visited Aug. 1,
2005) (describing Administration position set forth in court documents in the case of Dr.
Samuel Mudd).
war and thus may not be prosecuted for violating it.34  They may, however, be
prosecuted for most belligerent acts under ordinary domestic law, irrespective of
whether such an act would violate the international law of war if committed by a
soldier. Under international law, those offenders who are entitled to prisoner of war
(POW) status under the Third Geneva Convention [“GPW”] are entitled to be tried
by court-martial and may not be tried by a military commission offering fewer
safeguards than a general court-martial, even if those prisoners are charged with war
crimes.35  
Presumably, “offenses triable by military commission” would not include acts
triable by military commissions only in the context of a military occupation or
martial law.36  On the other hand, the language could be interpreted to reserve to the
military the discretion of determining what crimes may be tried.  The Supreme Court
has stated that charges of violations of the law of war tried before military
commissions need not be as exact as those brought before regular courts.37  The
Administration appears to take the view that the executive branch may determine
which acts violate the law of war and may be tried by military commission.38
According to this view, a military tribunal may need only to determine the existence
of some nexus between the offense and the military to establish its jurisdiction.
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction.  M.C.I. No. 2, Crimes and Elements for Trials
by Military Commission, details some of the crimes that might be subject to the
CRS-8
39 See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTIONS
SOURCEBOOK  95 (2003) [hereinafter “SOURCEBOOK”].  DoD has not made public an exact
account of who provided comments to the instruction, but some of them are published in the
Sourcebook. 
40 See M.C.I. No. 2 § 3(A) (“No offense is cognizable in a trial by military commission if
that offense did not exist prior to the conduct in question.”).
41 Crimes against the law of war listed in M.C.I. No. 2 are: 1) Willful Killing of Protected
Persons; 2) Attacking Civilians; 3) Attacking Civilian Objects; 4) Attacking Protected
Property;  5) Pillaging; 6) Denying Quarter; 7) Taking Hostages; 8) Employing Poison or
Analogous Weapons; 9) Using Protected Persons as Shields; 10) Using Protected Property
as Shields; 1) Torture; 2) Causing Serious Injury; 13) Mutilation or Maiming; 14) Use of
Treachery or Perfidy; 15) Improper Use of Flag of Truce; 16) Improper Use of Protective
Emblems; 17) Degrading Treatment of a Dead Body; and 18) Rape.
42 Crimes “triable by military commissions” include 1) Hijacking or Hazarding a Vessel or
Aircraft; 2) Terrorism; 3) Murder by an Unprivileged Belligerent; 4) Destruction of Property
by an Unprivileged Belligerent; 5) Aiding the Enemy; 6) Spying; 7) Perjury or False
Testimony; and 8) Obstruction of Justice Related to Military Commissions.  Listed as “other
forms of liability and related offenses” are: 1) Aiding or Abetting.   2) Solicitation; 3)
Command/Superior Responsibility - Perpetrating; 4) Command/Superior Responsibility -
Misprision; 5) Accessory After the Fact; 6) Conspiracy; and 7) Attempt.
43 Ordinarily, the charge of “aiding the enemy” would require the accused have allegiance
to the party whose enemy he has aided.  DoD added a comment to this charge explaining
that the wrongfulness requirement may necessitate that “in the case of a lawful belligerent,
the accused owe allegiance or some duty to the United States or an ally or coalition
partner...” such as “citizenship, resident alien status, or a contractual relationship with [any
of these countries].” M.C.I. No.2 §6(A)(5)(b)(3).  It is unclear what is meant by limiting the
requirement to “a lawful belligerent.”  It could be read to make those persons considered the
“enemy” also subject to trial for “aiding the enemy,”as is the case with Australian detainee
David Hicks.  See United States v. Hicks, Charge Sheet, available at
[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/d20040610cs.pdf](last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
44 18 U.S.C. § 2331 et seq. defines and punishes terrorism, providing exclusive  jurisdiction
(continued...)
jurisdiction of the commissions.  Unlike the rest of the M.C.I. issued so far, this
instruction was published in draft form by DoD for outside comment.  The final
version appears to have incorporated some of the revisions, though not all, suggested
by those who offered comments.39  The revision clarifies that the burden of proof is
on the prosecution, precludes liability for ex post facto crimes,40 adds two new war
crimes, and clearly delineates between war crimes and “other offenses triable by
military commission.”
M.C.I. No. 2 clarifies that the crimes and elements derive from the law of war,
but does not provide any references to international treaties or other sources that
comprise the law of war.  The instruction does not purport to be an exhaustive list;
it is intended as an illustration of acts punishable under the law of war41 or triable by
military commissions.42  “Aiding the enemy” and “spying” are included under the
latter group, but are not defined with reference to the statutory authority in UCMJ
articles 104 and 106 (though the language is very similar).43  Terrorism is also
defined without reference to the statutory definition in title 18, U.S. Code.44
CRS-9
44 (...continued)
to federal courts.  See id. at 35 (letter from National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers (NACDL) noting that Congress has defined war crimes in 18 U.S.C. § 2441 with
reference to specific treaties).
45 M.C.I. No. 2 § 6(18).  One of the elements of the crime of terrorism is that the “accused
did not enjoy combatant immunity or an object of the attack was not a military objective.”
Another element required that “the killing or destruction was an attack or part of an attack
designed to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government.”  The
final version of the M.C.I. omits the reference to “affect[ing] the conduct of a government.”
46 M.C.I. No. 2 § 6(19). 
47 Under M.C.I. No. 2, the lack of combatant immunity is considered an element of some of
the crimes rather than a defense, so the prosecutor has the burden of proving its absence.
48 Whether the prisoners at Guantánamo Bay should be considered lawful combatants with
combatant immunity is an issue of some international concern.  See generally  CRS Report
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It appears that “offenses triable by military commissions” in both the M.O. and
M.C.O. No. 1 could cover ordinary belligerent acts carried out by unlawful
combatants, regardless of whether they are technically war crimes.  The draft version
of M.C.I. No. 2 made explicit that 
Even an attack against a military objective that normally would be permitted
under the law of armed conflict could serve as the basis for th[e] offense [of
terrorism] if the attack itself constituted an unlawful belligerency (that is, if the
attack was committed by an accused who did not enjoy combatant immunity). 
Thus, under the draft language, it appeared that a Taliban fighter who attacked a U.S.
or coalition soldier, or perhaps even a soldier of the Northern Alliance prior to the
arrival of U.S. forces, for example, could be charged with “terrorism” and tried by
a military tribunal.45   
However, the final version of M.C.I. No.2 substituted the following language:
The requirement that the conduct be wrongful for this crime necessitates that the
conduct establishing the offense not constitute an attack against a lawful military
objective undertaken by military forces of a State in the exercise of their official
duties. 
The change appears to eliminate the possibility that Taliban fighters could be charged
with “terrorism” in connection with combat activities; however, such a fighter could
still be charged with murder or destruction of property “by an unprivileged
belligerent”46 for participating in combat, as long as the commission finds that the
accused “did not enjoy combatant immunity,” which, according the instruction, is
enjoyed only by “lawful combatants.”47  “Lawful combatant” is not further defined.
Inasmuch as the President has already declared that all of the detainees incarcerated
at Guantánamo Bay, whether members of the Taliban or members of Al Qaeda, are
unlawful combatants, it appears unlikely that the defense of combat immunity would
be available.48  It is unclear whether other defenses, such as self-defense or duress,
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RL31367, Treatment of ‘Battlefield Detainees’ in the War on Terrorism.  DoD’s original
draft included the requirement that a lawful combatant be part of the “armed forces of a
legitimate party to an armed conflict.” The Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights (now
known as Human Rights First or “HRF”) and Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) urged DoD
to revise the definition in line with the Geneva Convention.  See SOURCEBOOK, supra note
39, at 50-51 and 59.  The revised version leaves ambiguous who might be a “lawful
combatant.”
49 M.C.I. No. 2 § 4(B).  The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) objected to this
provision in its comments on the DoD draft, remarking that it “not only places the ordinary
burden on the accused to going forward with evidence that establishes affirmative defense,
but it also appears to place an unprecedented burden on the accused to overcome the
presumption that the defenses do not apply.”  See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 39, at 69.
50 See WINTHROP, supra note 21, at 773 (the law of war “prescribes the rights and
obligations of belligerents, or ... define[s] the status and relations not only of enemies —
whether or not in arms — but also of persons under military government or martial law and
persons simply resident or being upon the theatre of war, and which authorizes their trial and
punishment when offenders”); id at 836 (military commissions have valid jurisdiction only
in theater of war or territory under martial law or military government). 
51 It may be argued that no war has a specific deadline and that all conflicts are in a sense
indefinite.  In traditional armed conflicts, however, it has been relatively easy to identify
when hostilities have ended; for example, upon the surrender or annihilation of one party,
an annexation of territory under dispute, an armistice or peace treaty, or when one party to
the conflict unilaterally withdraws its forces. See GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG
NATIONS 722-730 (6th ed. 1992).  
52 See Human Rights First, Trial Under Military Order, A Guide to the Final Rules for
Mi l i t a ry  Commiss ions  (2004) [here inaf te r  “HRF”] ,  ava i lab le  a t
[http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/PDF/detainees/trials_under_order0604.pdf]](last
visited Aug. 1, 2005); Sadat, supra note 34, at 146 (noting possibly advantageous domestic
aspects of treating terrorist attacks as war crimes, but identifying possible pitfalls of creating
a new international legal regime).
would be available to the accused.  M.C.I. No. 2 states that such defenses may be
available, but that “[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, defenses in
individual cases are presumed not to apply.”49 
Temporal and Spatial Jurisdiction.  The law of war has traditionally
applied within the territorial and temporal boundaries of an armed conflict between
at least two belligerents.50  It has not traditionally been applied to conduct occurring
on the territory of neutral states or on the territory of a belligerent that lies outside the
zone of battle, to conduct that preceded the outbreak of hostilities, or to conduct
during hostilities that do not amount to an armed conflict.  With respect to the
international conflict in Afghanistan, in which coalition forces ousted the Taliban
government, it appears relatively clear when and where the law of war would apply.
The war on terrorism, however, does not have clear boundaries in time or space,51 nor
is it entirely clear who the belligerents are. The broad reach of the M.O. to encompass
conduct and persons customarily subject to ordinary criminal law has evoked
criticism that the claimed jurisdiction of the military commissions exceeds the
customary law of armed conflict, which M.C.I. No. 2 purports to restate.52  
CRS-11
53 M.C.I. No. 2 § 5(C).
54 Id.
55 See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 39, at 38-39 (NACDL comments); id. at 51 (Human Rights
Watch (HRW) comments); id. at 59-60 (LCHR).  However, M.C.I. No. 9 lists among
possible “material errors of law” for which the Reviewing Panel might return a finding for
further procedures, “a conviction of a charge that fails to state an offense that by statute or
the law of war may be tried by military commission. ...” M.C.I. No. 9 § 4(C)(2)(b).
56 See id. at 38 (NACDL comments).
57 See id. at 98 (commentary of Eugene R. Fidell and Michael F. Noone).
58 M.C.O. No. 1 § 4(A)(3). 
A common element among the crimes enumerated in M.C.I. No.2 is that the
conduct “took place in the context of and was associated with armed conflict.” The
instruction explains that the phrase requires a “nexus between the conduct and armed
hostilities,”53 which has traditionally been a necessary element of any war crime.
However, the definition of “armed hostilities” is broader than the customary
definition of  war or  “armed conflict.” “Armed hostilities” need not be a declared
war or “ongoing mutual hostilities.”54  Instead, any hostile act or attempted hostile
act might have sufficient nexus if its severity rises to the level of an “armed attack,”
or if it is intended to contribute to such acts.  Some commentators have argued that
the expansion of “armed conflict” beyond its customary bounds improperly expands
the jurisdiction of military commissions beyond those that by statute or under the law
of war are triable by military commissions.55  
The definition for “Enemy” provided in M.C.I. No. 2 raises similar issues.
According to § 5(B), “Enemy” includes
any entity with which the United States or allied forces may be engaged in armed
conflicts or which is preparing to attack the United States. It is not limited to
foreign nations, or foreign military organizations or members thereof. “Enemy”
specifically includes any organization of terrorists with international reach.
Some observers argue that this impermissibly subjects suspected international
criminals to the jurisdiction of military commissions in circumstances in which the
law of armed conflict has never applied.56  The distinction between a “war crime,”
traditionally subject to the jurisdiction of military commissions, and a common
crime, traditionally the province of criminal courts, may prove to be a matter of some
contention during some of the proceedings.57
Composition and Powers
Under M.C.O. No. 1, the military commissions will consist of a panel of three
to seven military officers as well as one or more alternate members who have been
“determined to be competent to perform the duties involved” by the Secretary of
Defense or his designee.58 These may include reserve personnel on active duty,
National Guard personnel in active federal service, and retired personnel recalled to
active duty.  They may also include persons temporarily commissioned by the
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59 See 10 U.S.C. § 603, listed as reference (e) of M.C.O. No. 1.
60 M.C.O. No. 1 § 4(A)(4).  See NIMJ, supra note 36, at 17 (commenting that the lack of a
military judge to preside over the proceedings is a significant departure from the UCMJ).
A judge advocate is a military officer of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps of the Army
or Navy (a military lawyer).  A military judge is a judge advocate who is certified as
qualified by the JAG Corps of his or her service to serve in a role similar to civilian judges.
61 See M.C.O. No. 1 § 3(C) (asserting jurisdiction over participants in commission
proceedings “as necessary to preserve the integrity and order of the proceedings”).
62  See 10 U.S.C. § 848.
63  See 10 U.S.C. § 847.  It is unclear how witnesses are “duly subpoenaed;” 10 U.S.C. § 846
empowers the president of the court-martial to compel witnesses to appear and testify and
to compel production of evidence, but this statutory authority does not explicitly apply to
military commissions.  The subpoena power extends to “any part of the United States, or the
Territories, Commonwealth and possessions.” 
President to serve as officers in the armed services during a national emergency.59
The presiding officer must be a judge advocate in any of the U.S. armed forces, but
need not be a military judge.60
The presiding officer has the authority to decide evidentiary matters and
interlocutory motions, or to refer them to the commission or certify them to
Appointing Authority for decision.  The presiding officer has the power to close any
portion of the proceedings in accordance with M.C.O. No. 1, and “to act upon any
contempt or breach of Commission rules and procedures,” including disciplining any
individual who violates any “laws, rules, regulations, or other orders” applicable to
the commission, as the presiding officer sees fit.  Presumably this power includes not
only military and civilian attorneys but also any witnesses who have been summoned
under order of the Secretary of Defense pursuant to M.C.O. No. 1 § 5(A)(5).61 The
UCMJ authorizes military commissions to punish contempt with a fine of $100,
confinement for up to 30 days, or both.62   Under the UCMJ, a duly subpoenaed
witness who is not subject to the UCMJ and who refuses to appear before a military
commission may be prosecuted in federal court.63  To the extent that M.C.O. No. 1
would allow disciplinary measures against civilian witnesses who refuse to testify or
produce other evidence as ordered by the commission, M.C.O. No. 1 would appear
to be inconsistent with the UCMJ.  
One of the perceived shortcomings of the M.O. has to do with the problem of
command influence over commission personnel.  M.C.O. No. 1 provides for a “full
and fair trial,” but contains few specific safeguards that appear to address the issue
of impartiality.  The President appears to have complete control over the proceedings.
He or his designee decide which charges to press, select the members of the panel,
the prosecution and the defense counsel, select the members of the review panel, and
approve and implement the final outcome.  The procedural rules are entirely under
the control of the President or his designees, who write them, interpret them, enforce
them, and may amend them at any time. All commission personnel other than the
commission members themselves are under the supervision of the Secretary of
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64 M.C.I. No. 6.
65 Id. § 3(A)(7).
66 Cf United States v. Wiesen, 56 M.J. 172 (2001), aff’d on reconsideration, 57 M.J. 48
(2002)(noting that command relationships among participants in court-martial proceeding
may give rise to “implied bias”).  
67  See 10 U.S.C. § 836 (providing military commission rules “may not be contrary to or
inconsistent with [the UCMJ]”).  But see In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1946)(finding
Congress did not intend the language “military commission” in Article 38 of the Articles of
War, the precursor to UCMJ Art. 36, to mean military commissions trying enemy
combatants).  On the other hand, President Bush explicitly invoked UCMJ art. 36 as
statutory authority for the M.O., and included a finding, “consistent with section 836 of title
10, United States Code, that it is not practicable to apply in military commissions under this
order the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of
criminal cases in the United States district courts.”  M.O. § 1(g).   
68 M.C.O. No. 1 § 1.
69 Id. § 10.
70 Id.; M.C.I. No. 1 § 6 (Non-Creation of Right).
Defense, directly or through the DoD General Counsel.64 The Secretary of Defense
is the direct supervisor of Review Panel members.65 Originally, both the Chief
Prosecutor and the Chief Defense Counsel were to report ultimately to the DoD
General Counsel, which led some critics to warn that defense counsel were
insufficiently independent from the prosecution.66 However, DoD amended the
instructions so that the Chief Prosecutor now reports to the Legal Advisor to the
Appointing Authority. 
The following sections summarize provisions of the procedural rules meant to
provide appropriate procedural safeguards.
Procedures Accorded the Accused
The military commissions established pursuant to M.C.O. No. 1 will have
procedural safeguards similar to many of those that apply in general courts-martial,
but the M.C.O. does not specifically adopt any procedures from the UCMJ, even
those that explicitly apply to military commissions.67  The M.C.O. provides that only
the procedures it prescribes or any supplemental regulations that may be established
pursuant to the M.O., and no others shall govern the trials,68 perhaps precluding
commissions from looking to the UCMJ or other law to fill in any gaps.  The M.C.O.
does not explicitly recognize that accused persons have rights under the law.  The
procedures that are accorded to the accused do not give rise to any enforceable right,
benefit or privilege, and are not to be construed as requirements of the U.S.
Constitution.69  The accused has no opportunity to challenge the interpretation of the
rules or seek redress in case of a breach.70
The procedural safeguards are for the most part listed in section 5. The accused
is entitled to be informed of the charges sufficiently in advance of trial to prepare a
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71  M.C.O. No. 1 § 5(A).
72 Id. §§ 5(B-C); 6(F).
73 Id. §§ 4(A)(5)(a); 5(K); 6B(3).
74 Id. §§ 5(B) and 6(B).
75  M.C.O. No. 1 § 6(D)(5).
76 See DoD Press Release, DoD Announces Media Coverage Opportunities for Military
Commissions (Feb. 11, 2004), available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/advisories/2004/
pa20040211-0205.html] (last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
77 See Toni Locy, Human Rights Groups Denied Seats at Tribunals, USA TODAY, Feb. 24,
2004, at A3.
78 Id. at § 6(B)(3)(“Open proceedings may include, at the discretion of the Appointing
Authority, attendance by the public and accredited press, and public release of transcripts
at the appropriate time.”) In courts-martial, “public” is defined to include members of the
military as well as civilian communities.  R.C.M. 806.
79 M.C.I. No. 3 § 5(C) (Prosecutor’s Office); M.C.I. No. 4 § 5(C) (Defense counsel,
including members of civilian defense counsel pool).  
80 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 602 (1982)(newspaper had
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defense,71 shall be presumed innocent until determined to be guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt by two thirds of the commission members,72 shall have the right not
to testify at trial unless he so chooses, shall have the opportunity to present evidence
and cross-examine witnesses for the prosecution, and may be present at every stage
of proceeding unless it is closed for security concerns or other reasons.73 The
presumption of innocence and the right against self-incrimination will result in an
entered plea of “Not Guilty” if the accused refuses to enter a plea or enters a “Guilty”
plea that is determined to be involuntary or ill informed.74 
Open Hearing.  The trials themselves will be conducted openly except to the
extent the Appointing Authority or presiding officer closes proceedings to protect
classified or classifiable information or information protected by law from
unauthorized disclosure, the physical safety of participants, intelligence or law
enforcement sources and methods, other national security interests, or “for any other
reason necessary for the conduct of a full and fair trial.”75 DoD invited members of
the press to apply for permission to attend the trials,76 although it initially informed
Human Rights Watch and other groups that logistical issues would likely preclude
their attendance.77 However, at the discretion of the Appointing Authority, “open
proceedings” need not necessarily be open to the public and the press.78  Proceedings
may be closed to the accused or the accused’s civilian attorney, but not to detailed
defense counsel.  Furthermore, counsel for either side must obtain permission from
the Appointing Authority or the DoD General Counsel in order to make a statement
to the press.79
Because the public, and not just the accused, has a constitutionally protected
interest in public trials, the extent to which trials by military commission are open to
the press and public may be subject to challenge by media representatives.80  The
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standing to challenge court order closing portions of criminal trial).
81 United States v. Hershey, 20 M.J. 433 (C.M.A.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1062 (1986);
United States v. Grunden, 2 M.J. 116 (C.M.A.1977).  The press has standing to challenge
closure of military justice proceedings. ABC, Inc. v. Powell, 47 M.J. 363, 365 (1997).
82 See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
83 Pell v.  Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-24 (1974).  
84 See Juan R. Torruella, On the Slippery Slopes of Afghanistan: Military Commissions and
the Exercise of Presidential Power, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 648, 718 (2002) (noting that
proceedings, if held at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Station, may be de facto closed due to
the physical isolation of the facility).
85 Cf. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir.2002),  (finding closure of
immigration hearings based on relation to events of Sept. 11 unconstitutional infringement
on the First Amendment right to free press). But see North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v.
Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002) cert denied 538 U.S. 1056 (2003)(no presumption of
openness for immigration hearings).
86 In practice, some of the detainees have been assigned counsel upon their designation as
subject to the President’s M.O.
87 M.C.O. No. 1 § 4(C). M.C.I. No. 4 § 3(D) lists criteria for the “availability” of selected
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First Amendment right of public access extends to trials by court-martial,81 but is not
absolute.  Trials may be closed only where the following test is met: the party seeking
closure demonstrates an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced; the closure
is narrowly tailored to protect that interest; the trial court has considered reasonable
alternatives to closure; and the trial court makes adequate findings to support the
closure.82  Because procedures established under M.C.O. No. 1 appear to allow the
exclusion of the press and public based on the discretion of the Appointing Authority
without any consideration of the above requirements with respect to the specific
exigencies of the case at trial, the procedures may implicate the First Amendment
rights of the press and public.
Although the First Amendment bars government interference with the free press,
it does not impose on the government a duty “to accord the press special access to
information not shared by members of the public generally.”83   The reporters’ right
to gather information does not include an absolute right to gain access to areas not
open to the public. Thus, if the military commissions were to sit in areas off-limits
to the public for other valid reasons, media access may be restricted for reasons of
operational necessity.84  Access of the press to the proceedings of military
commissions may be an issue of contention for the courts ultimately to decide, even
if those tried by military commission are determined to lack the protection of the
Sixth Amendment right to an open trial or means to challenge the trial.85
Right to Counsel.  Once charges are referred,86 the defendant will have
military defense counsel assigned free of cost, but may request another JAG officer,
who will be provided as a replacement if available in accordance with any applicable




88 But see Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (Const. Amend. VI guarantees the right
to self-representation). 
89 M.C.I. No. 4 § 3(C).
90 See HRF, supra note 52, at 2-3; Vanessa Blum, Tribunals Put Defense Bar in Bind, LEGAL
TIMES, July 14, 2003, at 1 (reporting that only 10 civilian attorneys had applied to join the
pool of civilian defense lawyers).
91 See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 39, at 136-37.
92 M.C.I. No. 5, Annex B,  “Affidavit and Agreement by Civilian Defense Counsel,” at §
II(E)(1).  The communications are subject to restrictions on classified or “protected”
information.  Id.
93 See DoD Press Release, supra note 11.
94 Originally, civilian attorneys were required to pay the costs associated with obtaining a
clearance.  M.C.I. No. 5 §3(A)(2)(d)(ii).  DoD has waived the administrative costs for
processing applications for TOP SECRET clearances in cases that would require the higher
level of security clearance.  See DoD Press Release No. 084-04 , New Military Commission
Orders, Annex Issued (Feb. 6, 2004), available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/
releases/2004/nr20040206-0331.html] (Last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
does not have the right to refuse counsel in favor of self-representation.88  M.C.I.
No. 4 requires detailed defense counsel to “defend the accused zealously within the
bounds of the law ...  notwithstanding any intention expressed by the accused to
represent himself.”89
The accused may also hire a civilian attorney at his own expense, but must be
represented by assigned defense counsel at all relevant times, even if he retains the
services of a civilian attorney.  Civilian attorneys may apply to qualify as members
of the pool of eligible attorneys, or may seek to qualify ad hoc at the request of an
accused.  Some critics argue the rules provide disincentives for the participation of
civilian lawyers.90  Civilian attorneys must agree that the military commission
representation will be his or her primary duty, and are not permitted to bring any
assistants, such as co-counsel or paralegal support personnel, with them to the
defense team.  Originally, all defense and case preparation was to be done on site,
and civilian attorneys were not to share documents or discuss the case with anyone
but the detailed counsel or the defendant.  These restrictions, read literally, might
have prevented civilian defense counsel from conducting witness interviews or
seeking advice from experts in humanitarian law, for example.91  However, the
Pentagon later released a new version of M.C.I. No. 5 that loosened the restrictions
to allow communications with “individuals with particularized knowledge that may
assist in discovering relevant evidence.”92
Civilian attorneys must meet strict qualifications to be admitted before a military
commission. The civilian attorney must be a U.S. citizen (except for those
representing Australian detainees93) with at least a SECRET clearance,94 who is
admitted to the bar of any state or territory.   Furthermore, the civilian attorney  may
not have any disciplinary record, and must agree in writing to comply with all rules
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97 See M.C.O. No. 3, “Special Administrative Measures for Certain Communications Subject
to Monitoring.”  The required affidavit and agreement annexed to M.C.I. No. 3 was
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100  M.C.O. No 1 § 4(A)(5)(c).
101 Id § 4(A)(5)(b).
of court.95 The civilian attorney is not guaranteed access to closed hearings or
information deemed protected under the rules, which may or may not include
classified information.96 
 The requirement that civilian counsel must agree that communications with the
client may be monitored has been modified to require prior notification and to permit
the attorney to notify the client when monitoring is to occur.97  Although the
government will not be permitted to use information against the accused at trial,
some argue the absence of the normal attorney-client privilege could impede
communications between them, possibly decreasing the effectiveness of counsel.
Civilian attorneys are bound to inform the military counsel if they learn of
information about a pending crime that could lead to “death, substantial bodily harm,
or a significant impairment of national security.”98  M.C.I. No. 5 provides no criteria
to assist defense counsel in identifying what might constitute a “significant
impairment of national security.”
All defense counsel are under the overall supervision of the Office of the Chief
Defense Counsel, which is entrusted with the proper management of personnel and
resources the duty to preclude conflicts of interest.99  The M.C.O. further provides
that “in no circumstance shall accommodation of counsel be allowed to delay
proceedings unreasonably.”100  The Appointing Authority may revoke any attorney’s
eligibility to appear before any commission.101
Some attorneys’ groups have voiced opposition to the restrictions and
requirements placed on civilian defense counsel, arguing the rules would not allow
a defense attorney ethically to represent any client.  The board of directors for the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers  issued an ethics statement saying
that it is unethical for a lawyer to represent a client before a military tribunal under
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Annex B.
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the current rules and that lawyers who choose to do so are bound to contest the
unethical conditions.”102  The House of Delegates of the American Bar Association
(ABA) took no position on whether civilian lawyers should participate in the
tribunals, but urged the Pentagon to relax some of the rules, especially with respect
to the monitoring of communications between clients and civilian attorneys.103  The
National Institute of Military Justice, while echoing concerns about the commission
rules, has stated that lawyers who participate will be performing an important public
service.104
Discovery.  The accused has the right to view evidence the Prosecution intends
to present as well as any exculpatory evidence known, as long as it is not deemed to
be protected under Sec. 6(D)(5).105 In courts-martial, by contrast, the accused has the
right to view any documents in the possession of the Prosecution related to the
charges, and evidence that reasonably tends to negate the guilt of the accused, reduce
the degree of guilt or reduce the punishment.106
The accused may also obtain witnesses and documents “to the extent necessary
and reasonably available as determined by the Presiding Officer” and subject to
secrecy determinations. The Appointing Authority shall make available to the
accused “such investigative or other resources” deemed necessary for a full and fair
trial.107  Access to other detainees who might be able to provide mitigating or
exculpatory testimony may be impeded by the prohibition on defense counsel from
entering into agreements with “other Accused or Defense Counsel that might cause
them or the Accused they represent to incur an obligation of confidentiality with such
other Accused or Defense Counsel or to effect some other impediment to
representation.”108  In other words, communications with potential witnesses would
not be privileged and could be used against the witness at his own trial.
The overriding consideration with regard to whether the accused or defense
counsel (including detailed defense counsel) may gain access to information appears
to be the need for secrecy.  The presiding officer may delete specific items from any
information to be made available to the accused or defense counsel, or may direct
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(continued...)
that unclassified summaries of protected information be prepared.109  However, no
evidence may be admitted for consideration by the rest of the commission members
unless it has been made available to at least the detailed defense counsel.110
Information that was reviewed by the presiding officer ex parte and in camera but
withheld from the defense over defense objection will be sealed and annexed to the
record of the proceedings for review by the various reviewing  authorities.111  Nothing
in the M.C.O. limits the purposes for which the reviewing authorities may use such
material.
Right to Face One’s Accuser.  The presiding officer may authorize any
methods appropriate to protect witnesses, including telephone or other electronic
means, closure of all or part of the proceedings and the use of pseudonyms.112 The
commission may consider sworn or unsworn statements, and these apparently may
be read into evidence without meeting the requirements for authentication of
depositions and without regard to the availability of the witness under the UCMJ, as
these provisions expressly apply to  military commissions.113  UCMJ articles 49 and
50 could be read to apply to military commissions the same rules against hearsay
used at courts-martial, however, the Supreme Court has declined to apply similar
provisions to military commissions trying enemy combatants.114 
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It is the provision for the use of secret evidence and for the exclusion of the
accused from portions of the hearings that the district court found most troubling in
Hamdan.115  The court declared “[i]t is obvious beyond the need for citation that such
a dramatic deviation from the confrontation clause could not be countenanced in any
American court . . .” and found it apparent that “the right to trial ‘in one’s presence’
is established as a matter of international humanitarian and human rights law.”116
Under UCMJ art. 39,117 the accused at a court-martial has the right to be present at
all proceedings other than the deliberation of the members.
Admissibility of Evidence.  The standard for the admissibility of evidence
remains as it was stated in the M.O.; evidence is admissible if it is deemed to have
“probative value to a reasonable person.”118  This is a significant departure from the
Military Rules of Evidence (Mil. R. Evid.), which provide that “[a]ll relevant
evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the
United States [and other applicable statutes, regulations and rules]”119  In a court-
martial, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by other factors.120 
“Probative value to a reasonable man” is a seemingly lax standard for
application to criminal trials.121  A reasonable person could find plausible sounding
rumors or hearsay to be at least somewhat probative, despite inherent questions of
reliability and fairness that both federal and military rules of evidence are designed
to address.  Furthermore, defendants before military commissions do not appear to
have the right to move that evidence be excluded because of its propensity to create
confusion or unfair prejudice, or because it was unlawfully obtained or coerced. 
Sentencing.  The prosecution must provide in advance to the accused any
evidence to be used for sentencing, unless good cause is shown. The accused may
present evidence and make a statement during sentencing proceedings, however, this
right does not appear to mirror the right to make an unsworn statement that military
defendants may exercise in regular courts-martial.122  Statements made by the accused
during the sentencing phase appear to be subject to cross-examination.
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Possible penalties include execution,123 imprisonment for life or any lesser term,
payment of a fine or restitution (which may be enforced by confiscation of property
subject to the rights of third parties), or “such other lawful punishment or condition
of punishment” determined to be proper.  Detention associated with the accused’s
status as an “enemy combatant” will not count toward serving any sentence
imposed.124  If the sentence includes confinement, it is unclear whether or how the
conditions of imprisonment will differ from that of detention as an “enemy
combatant.”  Sentences agreed in plea agreements are binding on the commission,
unlike regular courts-martial, in which the agreement is treated as the maximum
sentence.  Similar to the practice in military courts-martial, the death penalty may
only be imposed upon a unanimous vote of the Commission.125  In courts-martial,
however, both conviction for any crime punishable by death and any death sentence
must be by unanimous vote.126  None of the rules specify which offenses might be
eligible for the death penalty, but the Pentagon announced the death penalty will not
be sought in the cases brought so far.
Post-Trial Procedure
One criticism leveled at the language of the M.O. was that it does not include
an opportunity for the accused to appeal a conviction, and appears to bar habeas
corpus relief.  Another was that it appears to allow the Secretary of Defense (or the
President) the discretion to change the verdict, and does not protect persons from
double jeopardy.127  M.C.O. No.1 addresses these issues in part.
Review and Appeal.  The rules provide for the administrative review of the
trial record by the Appointing Authority, who forwards the record, if found
satisfactory, to a review panel consisting of three military officers, one of whom must
have experience as a judge.  The Bush Administration has announced its intent to
commission four individuals to active duty to serve on the Military Commission
Review Panels.128 They are Griffin Bell, a former U.S. attorney general and judge of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit; Edward Biester, a former Member of
the U.S. House of Representatives and current judge of the Court of Common Pleas
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of Bucks County, Pennsylvania; the Honorable William T. Coleman Jr., a former
Secretary of Transportation; and Chief Justice Frank Williams of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court.
There is no opportunity for the accused to appeal a conviction in the ordinary
sense.  The review panel may, however, at its discretion, review any written
submissions from the prosecution and the defense, who do not appear to have an
opportunity to view or rebut the submission from the opposing party.129  If the review
panel forms a “firm and definite conviction that a material error of law occurred,” it
returns the case to the Appointing Authority for further proceedings. If the review
panel determines that one or more charges should be dismissed, the Appointing
Authority is bound to do so.130  For other cases involving errors, the Appointing
Authority is required to return the case to the military commission.  Otherwise, the
case is forwarded to the Secretary of Defense with a written recommendation. (Under
the UCMJ, the trial record of a military commission would be forwarded to the
appropriate JAG first).131   
After reviewing the record, the Secretary of Defense may forward the case to the
President or return it for further proceedings for any reason, not explicitly limited to
material errors of law.  The M.C.O. does not indicate what “further proceedings” may
entail.  If the Secretary of Defense is delegated final approving authority, he can
approve or disapprove the finding, or mitigate or commute the sentence.  The rules
do not clarify what happens to a case that has been “disapproved.”  It is unclear
whether a disapproved finding is effectively vacated and remanded to the military
commission for a rehearing.  
The UCMJ forbids rehearings or appeal by the government of verdicts
amounting to a finding of Not Guilty, and prohibits the invalidation of a verdict or
sentence due to an error of law unless the error materially prejudices the substantial
rights of the accused.132  The M.C.O. does not contain any such explicit prohibitions,
but M.C.I. No. 9 defines “Material Error of Law” to exclude variances from the M.O.
or any of the military orders or instructions promulgated under it that would not have
had a material effect on the outcome of the military commission.133  M.C.I. No. 9
allows the review panel to recommend the disapproval of a finding of Guilty on a
basis other than a material error of law.134  It does not indicate what options the
review panel would have with respect to findings of Not Guilty.
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M.C.O. No. 1 does not provide a  route for a convicted person to appeal to any
independent authority. Persons subject to the M.O. are described as not privileged to
“seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly” in federal or
state court, the court of any foreign nation, or any international tribunal.135  However,
a defendant may petition a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the
jurisdiction of the military commission.136
Protection against Double Jeopardy.  The M.C.O. provides that the
accused may not be tried for the same charge twice by any military commission once
the commission’s finding on that charge becomes final (meaning once the verdict and
sentence have been approved).137  Therefore, apparently, jeopardy does not attach —
there has not been a “trial” — until the final verdict has been approved by the
President or the Secretary of Defense.  In contrast, at general courts-martial, jeopardy
attaches after the first introduction of evidence by the prosecution.  If a charge is
dismissed or is terminated by the convening authority after the introduction of
evidence but prior to a finding, through no fault of the accused, or if there is a finding
of Not Guilty, the trial is considered complete for purposes of jeopardy, and the
accused may not be tried again for the same charge by any U.S. military or federal
court without the consent of the accused.138 Although M.C.O. No. 1 provides that an
authenticated verdict139 of Not Guilty by the commission may not be changed to
Guilty,140 either the Secretary of Defense or the President may disapprove the finding
and return the case for “further proceedings” prior to the findings’ becoming final,
regardless of the verdict.  If a finding of Not Guilty is referred back to the
commission for rehearing, double jeopardy may be implicated.141
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Another double jeopardy issue that might arise is related to the requirements for
the specification of charges.142  M.C.O. No. 1 does not provide a specific form for the
charges, and does not require an oath or signature.143  If the charge does not
adequately describe the offense, another trial for the same offense under a new
description is not as easily prevented.  M.C.I. No. 2, setting forth elements of crimes
triable by the commissions, may provide an effective safeguard; however, new crimes
may be added to its list at any time.
The M.O. also left open the possibility that a person subject to the order might
be transferred at any time to some other governmental authority for trial.144  A federal
criminal trial, as a trial conducted under the same sovereign as a military
commission, could have double jeopardy implications if the accused had already been
tried by military commission for the same crime or crimes, even if the commission
proceedings did not result in a final verdict.  The federal court would face the issue
of whether jeopardy had already attached prior to the transfer of the individual from
military control to other federal authorities.
Conversely, the M.O. provides the President may determine at any time that an
individual is subject to the M.O., at which point any state or federal authorities
holding the individual would be required to turn the accused over to military
authorities.  If the accused were already the subject of a federal criminal trial under
charges for the same conduct that resulted in the President’s determination that the
accused is subject to the M.O., and if jeopardy had already attached in the federal
trial, double jeopardy could be implicated by a new trial before a military
commission.  M.C.O. No. 1 does not explicitly provide for a double jeopardy defense
under such circumstances.
Rumsfeld v. Hamdan
In Rasul v. Bush,145 a divided Supreme Court declared that “a state of war is not
a blank check for the president” and ruled that persons deemed “enemy combatants”
have the right to challenge their detention before a judge or other “neutral
decision-maker.” The decision did not address the use of military commissions, but
in holding that the detainees have recourse to federal courts to challenge their
detention, makes it likely that detainees convicted by military commission will be
able to challenge such convictions in federal court.  The extent to which they may
enforce any rights they may have under the Geneva Conventions and other law,
however, remains unclear.  The Justice Department interprets Rasul v. Bush as a
decision regarding jurisdiction only, and considers that the 1950 Supreme Court
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decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager146 remains applicable to limit the relief that
detainees may be granted.
Salim Ahmed Hamdan, who was captured in Afghanistan and is alleged to have
worked for Osama Bin Laden as a bodyguard and driver, brought an interlocutory
challenge to the lawfulness of the military commission convened to try him for
“conspiracy to commit attacks on civilians and civilian objects, murder and
destruction of property by an unprivileged belligerent, and terrorism.”  Hamdan’s
attorney objected to the military commission rules and procedures, which he argued
were inconsistent with the UCMJ and Hamdan’s right to be treated as a prisoner of
war under the Geneva Conventions.  U.S. District Judge Robertson agreed, finding
that the Geneva Conventions apply to the whole of the conflict in Afghanistan,
including under their protections all persons detained in connection with the
hostilities there.147  Accordingly, he ruled, Hamdan was entitled to be treated as a
prisoner of war until his status was determined to be otherwise by a competent
tribunal, in accordance with GPW article 5.
With respect to the President’s military order establishing military commissions,
the district court judge found no inherent authority in the President as Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces to create such tribunals, and that existing statutory
authority for military commissions is limited.  Interpreting the statute in light of the
Geneva Conventions, which permits the punishment of prisoners of war “only if the
sentence has been pronounced by the same courts according to the same procedure
as in the case of members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power,”148 Judge
Robertson found no congressional authority for Hamdan’s trial under the DoD’s rules
for military commissions.  Hamdan, he ruled, was not “an offender triable by military
tribunal under the law of war” within the meaning of UCMJ art 21.149  Further, he
found the rules established by DoD to be fatally inconsistent with the UCMJ,
contrary to UCMJ art. 36150 because they give military authorities the power to
exclude the accused from hearings and deny him access to evidence presented against
him.151 
The government appealed, arguing that the district court should not have
interfered in the military commission prior to its completion, that Hamdan is not
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entitled to protection from the Geneva Conventions, and that the President has
inherent authority to establish military commissions, which need not conform to
statutes regulating military courts-martial.152  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected the government’s argument that the federal courts had no jurisdiction to
interfere in ongoing commission proceedings, but otherwise agreed with the
government. Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Randolph reversed the lower
court’s finding, ruling that the Geneva Conventions are not judicially enforceable,153
that even if they were, Hamdan is not entitled to their protections, and that in any
event, the military commission would qualify as a “competent tribunal” where
Hamdan may challenge his non-POW status, within the meaning of U.S. Army
regulations implementing the Conventions.154 
The appellate court did not accept the government’s argument that the President
has inherent authority to create military commissions without any authorization from
Congress, but found such authority in the Authorization to Use Military Force
(AUMF),155 read together with UCMJ arts. 21 and 36.156 The court, however,
interpreted art. 36 to mean that military commission rules have only to be consistent
with those articles of the UCMJ that refer specifically to military commissions, and
not that Congress meant to incorporate procedural rules for courts-martial into those
applicable to military commissions.  However, because the procedural rules to be
used by the military commissions do not, in its view, affect jurisdiction, the court
found it unnecessary to resolve the issue at the interlocutory stage of the case.  The
court thus left open the possibility that Hamdan can challenge the procedural rules
if he is convicted by the military commission, possibly by bringing a new habeas
corpus petition in federal court. 
With respect to the Geneva Conventions, the D.C. Circuit cited to a footnote
from the Eisentrager opinion that expresses doubt that the Court could grant relief
based directly on the 1929 Geneva Convention:
We are not holding that these prisoners have no right which the military
authorities are bound to respect.  The United States, by the Geneva Convention
of July 27, 1929.  47 Stat. 2021, concluded ... an agreement upon the treatment
to be accorded captives.  These prisoners claim to be and are entitled to its
protection.  It is, however, the obvious scheme of the Agreement that
responsibility for observance and enforcement of these rights is upon political
and military authorities.  Rights of alien enemies are vindicated under it only
through protests and intervention of protecting powers as the rights of our
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citizens against foreign governments are vindicated only by Presidential
intervention.157
However, it might be noted that the Eisentrager Court did consider the 1929
Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War in the context of whether military
commissions lacked jurisdiction because they failed to apply adequate procedures.
The Court rejected the contention, but based its holding not on whether the Geneva
Conventions are enforceable in court, but on its earlier interpretation that the relevant
language in the 1929 Convention applied only to disciplinary offenses committed
during capture and not to pre-capture violations of the law of war.158  The 1949
Geneva Convention, however, was drafted to clarify that it applies to trials for any
offense, whether committed during or prior to internment.159  The Supreme Court in
Rasul remarked in a footnote that the detainees had stated a claim under the habeas
statute,160 which statute had been interpreted by the Eisentrager Court to be
inapplicable to the claims then at issue, but did not state whether the claim was based
on statute, the Constitution, or a treaty of the United States, and did not indicate
whether a treaty must be self-executing in order to be invoked in a habeas
proceeding.  The D.C. Circuit interpreted Rasul to apply to jurisdiction only, and not
to imply that relief could necessarily be granted on such a claim. This issue is likely
to return to the Supreme Court for clarification.
Judge Williams wrote a concurring opinion, agreeing with the government’s
conception of the conflict with Al Qaeda as separate from the conflict with the
Taliban, but construing Common Article 3 to apply to any conflict with a non-state
actor, without regard to the geographical confinement of such a conflict within the
borders of a signatory state.  Supreme Court nominee John G. Roberts concurred in
the opinion without writing separately.
Role of Congress
The President’s order appears to be broader than the authority exercised by
previous Presidents and may cover aliens in the United States legally who are citizens
of countries with which the nation is at peace. M.C.O. No. 1 clarifies that the
commissions will have jurisdiction only over violations of the law of war but does
not expressly limit jurisdiction to coincide with Congress’ authorization for the use
of force. It does not limit the provisions appearing to allow for the indefinite
detention of non-citizens, whether or not they are accused of having committed a
violation of the law of war, based solely on the President’s determination that there
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is reason to believe the individual is a member of the class of persons subject to the
order, in possible contradiction to the USA PATRIOT Act.161  It does not clarify
whether the President intends to use the statutory definitions of “acts of international
terrorism” to determine who is subject to the order. 
Congress has the authority to regulate the operation of military commissions,
but has not in the past prescribed procedural regulations.162  Congress may also draft
legislation defining offenses against the law of war triable by military commissions.
Because the draft regulations appear to provide some of the safeguards critics argued
were missing from the original M.O., supporters of the Administration’s policy will
likely urge Congress not to interfere.  Notably, M.C.O. No 1 is subject to amendment
without notification to Congress, and the Secretary of Defense has the authority to
direct that some other procedures be used.163  M.C.O. No. 1 also states that no “other
rules” will govern, which could mean that the rules are not to be construed with
reference to the UCMJ or any other statute.  Indeed, M.C.O. No. 1 §  10 states that
“[n]o provision in [the] Order shall be construed to be a requirement of the United
States Constitution.” Finally, an act of Congress would appear necessary to enable
the federal courts to take appellate jurisdiction over the military commissions.164 
Several bills were introduced in the 108thCongress to address military
commissions. The Military Tribunal Authorization Act of 2003, introduced in the
Senate as  Title I, subtitle C of S. 22 (Justice Enhancement and Domestic Security
Act of 2003), and in the House of Representatives as H.R. 1290, would have
authorized the establishment of extraordinary tribunals for offenses arising from the
September 11, 2001 attacks. The bill would have narrowed the field of potential
defendants from that stated in the M.O., expanded the minimum procedural
requirements to be established by the Secretary of Defense, and provided for appeal
to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces and review by the Supreme Court on
writ of certiorari.  H.R. 2428 would have provided for congressional review and
possible disapproval of regulations relating to military tribunals.  None of these bills
advanced beyond referral to committee.
Two bills in the 109th Congress would provide for military commissions.  The
Guantanamo Detainees Procedures Act of 2005, H.R. 3038, affirms the President’s
authority to detain certain foreign nationals and prescribes procedural rules with
respect to their detention and possible trial by military commission, apparently
irrespective of where a covered person is captured or detained. Convictions would
be subject to administrative review by the Defense Department and appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, with the possibility of review
by the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari.
CRS-29
165 18 U.S.C. § 2331 defines “international terrorism” to mean activities that — 
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal
laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if
committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended — 
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or 
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping; and 
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend
national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons
they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators
operate or seek asylum.
166 See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896)(aliens are entitled to due
process of law).
The Military Commissions Act of 2005, H.R. 3044, would amend the UCMJ to
include a new article 135a, entitled “Military commissions for offenses against the
law of war or in furtherance of terrorism.”  The bill would authorize the President to
appoint military commissions to try law-of-war violations or “any offense defined in
United States law when such offense is committed in furtherance of international
terrorism as defined in section 2331 of title 18.”165  The bill does not contain
geographical limitations as to jurisdiction; the use of military commissions to try
aliens for terrorism-related crimes not cognizable under the law of war, at least for
offenses committed within the United States, could raise constitutional questions.166
The bill would authorize the President to promulgate procedural rules for trials
under UCMJ art. 36 (10 U.S.C. § 836), but would expressly require such rules to
contain certain minimum due process guarantees, including the right to a fair trial.
Unlike the military commissions established under M.C.O. No. 1, the proposed
military commissions under H.R. 3044 would have a judge advocate appointed as the
presiding officer, who would act in a role similar to that of military judge.  The
presiding officer would instruct the members of the commission on all matters of law
and procedure, including interlocutory questions that arise during the proceedings.
Other commission members would vote to decide the factual issues.  The Court of
Appeals of the Armed Forces (CAAF) would review sentences of death or
imprisonment for five or more years, or other cases as prescribed by the President.
The bill would also require DoD to submit an annual report on its use of military
commissions, applicable procedural rules, and an accounting of funds.
The following charts provide a comparison of the proposed military tribunals
under the regulations issued by the Department of Defense, standard procedures for
general courts-martial under the Manual for Courts-Martial, and military tribunals as
proposed H.R. 3038 and H.R. 3044. Table 1 compares the legal authorities for
establishing military tribunals, the jurisdiction over persons and offenses, and the
different structures of the tribunals.  Table 2, which compares procedural safeguards
incorporated in the DoD regulations and the UCMJ, follows the same order and
format used in CRS Report RL31262, Selected Procedural Safeguards in Federal,
Military, and International Courts, in order to facilitate comparison of the proposed
legislation to safeguards provided in federal court and the International Criminal
Court.  
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Procedures Act of 2005
H.R. 3038
Authority U.S. Constitution, Article I,
§ 8.
U.S. Constitution, Article II;
Presidential Military Order of
Nov. 13, 2001 (M.O).
U.S. Constitution, Article I,
§ 8.
U.S. Constitution, Article I,
§ 8.
Procedure Rules are provided by the
Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), chapter 47,
title 10, and the Rules for
Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) and
the Military Rules of Evidence
(Mil. R. Evid.), issued by the
President pursuant to art. 36,
UCMJ.
10 U.S.C. § 836.
Rules are issued by the
Secretary of Defense pursuant
to the M.O.  No other rules
apply  (presumably excluding
the UCMJ).
§ 1.
The President has declared it
“impracticable” to employ
procedures used in federal
court, pursuant to 10 U.S.C.
§ 836.
The President may prescribe
rules of evidence and
procedure for trial by a
military commission pursuant
to art. 36, UCMJ. The
President may further delegate
authority to prescribe such
rules to the Secretary of
Defense.
Proposed 10 U.S.C. § 935a(i).
The Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Secretary
of State and the Attorney





Members of the armed forces,
cadets, midshipmen, reservists
while on inactive-duty
training, members of the
National Guard or Air
National Guard when in
federal service, prisoners of
war in custody of the armed
forces, civilian employees
Individual subject to M.O.,
determined by President to be:
1. a non-citizen, and 
2. a member of Al Qaeda or
person who has engaged in
acts related to terrorism
against the United States, or
who has harbored  one or more
such individuals
Any person, not a citizen of
the United States (accused of
certain offenses).
Proposed 10 U.S.C. § 935a(b).
An individual, not a United
States person, lawful
permanent resident, or POW,
who is accused of knowingly
planning, authorizing,
committing, aiding, or abetting
one or more terrorist acts
against the United States; or is
accused of being part of or
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accompanying the armed
forces in time of declared war,
and certain others, including
“persons within an area leased
by or otherwise reserved or
acquired for the use of the
United States.”
10 U.S.C. § 802; United States
v. Averette, 17 USCMA 363
(1968) (holding “in time of
war” to mean only wars
declared by Congress.
Individuals who are subject to
military tribunal jurisdiction
under the law of war may also
be tried by general court
martial.
10 U.S.C. § 818.
and is referred to the
commission by the Appointing
Authority.
§ 3(A).
supporting forces engaged in





Any offenses made punishable
by the UCMJ; offenses subject
to trial by military tribunal
under the law of war.
10 U.S.C. § 818.
Offenses in violation of the
laws of war and all other
offenses triable by military
commission.
§ 3(B).
M.C.I. No. 2 clarifies that
terrorism and related crimes
Offenses against the law of
war or any offense defined in
United States law when such
offense is committed in
furtherance of international
terrorism as defined in 18
U.S.C. §  2331.
Violations of the law of war,
international laws of armed
conflict, and crimes against
humanity targeted against
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are “crimes triable by military
commission.” 
Proposed 10 U.S.C. § 935a(b).
Composition A military judge and not less
than five members.
R.C.M. 501.
From three to seven members,
as determined by the
Appointing Authority. 
§ 4(A)(2).
From three to seven members;
in a cases where the death
penalty is possible, the
commission must have seven
members.
Proposed 10 U.S.C. § 935a(c)
Procedural rules must require
that the tribunal be comprised
of a military judge and not less
than five members.
§ 6(a)(20).
Source: Congressional Research Service.
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If the defendant fails to enter a
proper plea, a plea of not guilty
will be entered.
R.C.M. 910(b).
 Members of court martial must
be instructed that the “accused
must be presumed to be innocent
until the accused’s guilt is
established by legal and
competent evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt.” 
R.C.M. 920(e).
The accused shall be properly
attired in uniform with grade
insignia and any decorations to
which entitled.  Physical restraint
shall not be imposed unless
prescribed by the military judge.
R.C.M. 804.
The accused shall be presumed
innocent until proven guilty.  
§ 5(B).  
Commission members must base
their vote for a  finding of guilty
on evidence admitted at trial. 
§§ 5(C); 6(F).  
The Commission must determine
the voluntary and informed
nature of any plea agreement
submitted by the accused and
approved by the Appointing
Authority  before admitting it as
stipulation into evidence.  
§ 6(B).  
Procedural rules are required to
provide that the accused must be
presumed innocent until proven
guilty on each element of an
offense.
Proposed 10 U.S.C. § 935a(i)(2).
Procedural rules are required to
provide that the accused be
presumed innocent until proven
guilty, and not be found guilty







statutory equivalent of Miranda
warning are not admissible as
Not provided.  Neither the M.O.
nor M.C.O.  requires a warning
or bars the use of statements
made during military
Procedural rules must provide
that evidence obtained through
the use of torture will not be
admitted in evidence at trial by a
Procedural rules must provide
that the accused not be
compelled to confess guilt.
§ 6(a)(15).
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evidence. Persons subject to the
UCMJ are prohibited from
compelling any individual to
make a confession
10 U.S.C. § 831.
The prosecutor must notify the
defense of any incriminating
statements made by the accused
that are relevant to the case prior
to the arraignment.  Motions to
suppress such statements must be
made prior to pleading.
Mil. R. Evid. 304.
interrogation, or any coerced
statement, from military
commission proceedings.  
Art. 31(a), UCMJ (10 U.S.C. §
831) bars persons subject to it
from compelling any individual
to make a confession, but there
does not appear to be a remedy
in case of violation. No person
subject to the UCMJ may
compel any person to give
evidence before any military
tribunal if the evidence is not
material to the issue and may
tend to degrade him.  
10 U.S.C. § 831.  
military commission.  Proposed
10 U.S.C. § 935a(i)(5-7).
Presumably, art. 31 UCMJ
would also apply, insofar as it
prohibits service members from
compelling testimony, but not as
to its exclusionary rule.
10 U.S.C. § 831.
Presumably, art. 31 UCMJ
would also apply, insofar as it
prohibits service members from
compelling testimony, but not as
to its exclusionary rule.
10 U.S.C. § 831.
Rules must also afford the
accused “all necessary means of







“Evidence obtained as a result of
an unlawful search or seizure ...
is inadmissible against the
accused ...” unless certain
exceptions apply.  
Mil. R. Evid. 311.
“Authorization to search” may be
oral or written, and may be
issued by a military judge or an
Not provided; no exclusionary
rule appears to be available. 
However, monitored
conversations between the
detainee and defense counsel
may not be communicated to
persons involved in prosecuting
the accused or used at trial 
M.C.O. No. 3.
Not provided. Not provided.
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officer in command of the area to
be searched, or if the area is not
under military control, with
authority over persons subject to
military law or the law of war.  It
must be based on probable cause. 
Mil. R. Evid. 315.
Interception of wire and oral
communications within the
United States requires judicial
application in accordance with 18
U.S.C. §§ 2516 et seq.
Mil. R. Evid. 317.
A search conducted by foreign
officials is unlawful only if the
accused is subject to “gross and
brutal treatment.”  
Mil. R. Evid. 311(c).
 No provisions for determining
probable cause or issuance of
search warrants are included. 
 Insofar as  searches and seizures
take place outside of the United
States against non-U.S. persons,
the Fourth Amendment may not
apply.
United States v. Verdugo




The right to an attorney attaches
during the investigation phase
under art. 32, UCMJ.
10 U.S.C. § 832.
The defendant has a right to
military counsel at government
expense.  The defendant may
M.C.O. 1 provides that the
accused must be represented “at
all relevant times” (presumably,
once charges are approved until
findings are final — but not for
individuals who are detained but
not charged) by  detailed defense
Procedural rules are required to
provide that the accused be
entitled to “assistance of counsel
at all stages of proceedings” and
to “adequate time and facilities
available for the preparation of
his defense.” The accused would
Procedural rules must ensure that
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choose counsel, if that attorney is
reasonably available, and may
hire a civilian attorney in
addition to military counsel.  
10 U.S.C. § 838.
Appointed counsel must be
certified as qualified and may not
be someone who has taken any
part in the  investigation or
prosecution, unless explicitly
requested by the defendant. 
10 U.S.C. § 827.
The attorney-client privilege is
honored.  
Mil. R. Evid. 502.
counsel. 
§ 4(C)(4).  
The accused is assigned a
military judge advocate to serve
as counsel, but may request to
replace or augment  the detailed
counsel with a specific officer, if
that person is available.
 § 4(C)(3)(a).  
The accused may also hire a
civilian attorney who is a U.S.
citizen, is admitted to the bar in
any state, district, or possession,
has a SECRET clearance (or
higher, if necessary for a
particular case), and agrees to
comply with all applicable rules. 
The civilian attorney does not
replace the detailed counsel, and
is not guaranteed access to
classified evidence or closed
hearings.
 § 4(C)(3)(b).
Defense Counsel may present
evidence at trial and cross-
also have the right to represent
himself , subject to the discretion
of the presiding officer.
Proposed 10 U.S.C. § 935a(i)(8).
Trial and defense counsel would
be detailed on the same basis as
such counsel are detailed for a
general court-martial under 10
U.S.C. § 827 (UCMJ art. 27),
which delegates to the
“Secretaries involved” the
authority to make regulations
concerning the appointment of
counsel. Presumably, the rules
for military commissions could
differ from those for courts-
martial. The right of the accused
to select reasonably available
counsel, found in 10 U.S.C.
§ 838, would not be
incorporated.
Proposed 10 U.S.C. § 935a(e).
Procedural rules would be
required to provide that detailed
defense counsel may not be
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examine witnesses for the
prosecution. 
 § 5(I).  
The Appointing Authority must
order such resources be provided
to the defense as he deems
necessary for a “full and fair
trial.”  
§ 5(H).  
Communications between
defense counsel and the accused
are subject to monitoring by the
government.  Although
information obtained through
such monitoring may not be used
as evidence against the accused,
M.C.I. No. 3, the monitoring
could have a chilling effect on
attorney-client conversations,
possibly hampering the ability of
defense counsel to provide
effective representation.  
excluded from any trial
proceeding or any portion
thereof.




The right to indictment by grand
jury is explicitly excluded in
Probably not applicable to
military commissions, provided
Procedural rules are required to
provide that the accused is
Procedural rules are required to
provide a preliminary proceeding
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Whenever an offense is alleged,
the commander is responsible for
initiating a preliminary inquiry
under art. 32, UCMJ, and
deciding how to dispose of the
offense.
10 U.S.C. § 832; R.C.M. 303-06.
The accused must be advised of
the charges brought against him
and has the right to an attorney
during the investigation and
hearing proceedings.
10 U.S.C. § 832.
the accused is an enemy
belligerent.  
See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1
(1942).
The Office of the Chief
Prosecutor prepares charges for
referral by the Appointing
Authority. 
§ 4(B).  
There is no requirement for an
impartial investigation prior to a
referral of charges. The
Commission may adjust a
charged offense in a manner that
does not change the nature or
increase the seriousness of the
charge.  
§ 6(F).
informed of the charges against
him in a language he understands
as soon as practicable prior to
trial.
Proposed 10 U.S.C. § 935a(i)(3).
There is no requirement for a
preliminary inquiry.
within 30 days of detention,
which may be continued for an
additional 30 days for good
cause shown, to determine
whether there is jurisdiction







Charges and specifications must
be signed under oath and made
known to the accused as soon as
practicable. 
10 U.S.C. § 830.
Copies of approved charges are
provided to the accused and
Defense Counsel in English and
another language the accused
understands, if appropriate. 
§ 5(A).  
No express requirement that
charges be written.
No express requirement that
charges be written.
Right to be The presence of the accused is The accused may be present at The procedural rules are required The procedural rules are required
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required during arraignment, at
the plea, and at every stage of the
court-martial unless the accused
waives the right by voluntarily
absenting him or herself from the
proceedings after the arraignment
or by persisting in conduct that
justifies the trial judge in
ordering the removal of the
accused from the proceedings.
R.C.M. 801.
every stage of trial before the
Commission unless the Presiding
Officer excludes the accused
because of disruptive conduct or
for security reasons, or “any
other reason necessary for the
conduct of a full and fair trial.” 
§§ 4(A)(5)(a); 5(K);  6B(3).
to provide that the accused has
the “right to be present at each
stage of the proceedings, unless
he engages in conduct that the
presiding officer determines to
be disruptive, or the presiding
officer determines that exclusion
of the accused is necessary to
protect national security interests
of the United States.”
Proposed 10 U.S.C.
§ 935a(i)(12).
to provide that the accused has
the opportunity to be present at
trial.
§ 6(a)(5). 
Rules must also provide that the
proceedings be made
simultaneously intelligible for
participants not conversant in the








Courts-martial will not enforce
an ex post facto law, including
increasing amount of pay to be
forfeited for specific crimes.
U.S. v. Gorki, 47 M.J. 370
(1997).
Not provided, but may be
implicit in restrictions on
jurisdiction over offenses.
See  § 3(B).  M.C.I. No. 2 § 3(A)
provides that “no offense is
cognizable in a trial by military
commission if that offense did
not exist prior to the conduct in
question.”
Not expressly provided, but may
be implicit in jurisdictional
limitation to “offenses against
the law of war or any offense
defined in United States law
when such offense is committed
in furtherance of international
terrorism.”
Procedural rules are to prohibit
conviction for an alleged offense
not based upon an act, offense,
or omission that was not an
offense under law when it was
committed, and to provide that
the penalty for an offense not be
greater than it was when the
offense was committed.
CRS-40
General Courts-Martial Military Commission OrderNo. 1 (M.C.O.) 










Double jeopardy clause applies. 
See Wade v. Hunter, 336 US 684,
688-89 (1949). 
Art. 44, UCMJ prohibits double
jeopardy, provides for jeopardy
to attach after introduction of
evidence.
10 U.S.C. § 844.
General court-martial proceeding
is considered to be a federal trial
for double jeopardy purposes. 
Double jeopardy does not result
from charges brought in state or
foreign courts, although court-
martial in such cases is
disfavored.
U. S. v. Stokes, 12 M.J. 229
(C.M.A. 1982).
Once military authorities have
turned service member over to
civil authorities for trial, military
may have waived jurisdiction for
that crime, although it may be
possible to charge the individual
The accused may not be tried
again by any Commission for a
charge once a Commission’s
finding becomes final. 
(Jeopardy appears to attach when
the finding becomes final, at
least with respect to subsequent
U.S. military commissions.)
§ 5(P).  
However, although  a finding of
Not Guilty by the Commission
may not be changed to Guilty,
either the  reviewing panel, the
Appointing Authority, the
Secretary of Defense, or the
President may return the case for
“further proceedings” prior to
the findings’ becoming final. If a
finding of Not Guilty is vacated
and retried, double jeopardy may
be implicated. 
The order does not specify
whether a person already tried by
any other court or tribunal may
Procedural rules are required to
prohibit the trial of an accused “a
second time for the same
offense,” presumably including
cases where the accused has
been tried for the offense in
another jurisdiction, although it
could be read to prohibit only




The Secretary of Defense does
not have the discretion to
disapprove a finding of “not
guilty,” and consequently, such
verdicts would not be subject to
appellate review.
Proposed 10 U.S.C. § 935a(k).
Not expressly provided. The
Secretary of Defense is not
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for another crime arising from
the same conduct. 
See 54 AM. JUR. 2D, Military and
Civil Defense §§ 227-28.
The government may only appeal
orders or rulings that do not
amount to a finding of not guilty.
10 U.S.C. § 862.
The judge advocate only reviews
cases in which there has been a
finding of guilty.
10 U.S.C. § 864.
be tried by a military
commission under the M.O.
The M.O. reserves for the
President the authority to direct
the Secretary of Defense to
transfer an individual subject to
the M.O. to another
governmental authority, which is
not precluded by the order from
prosecuting the individual.  This
subsection could be read to
authorize prosecution by federal
authorities after the individual





In general, accused must be
brought to trial within 120 days
of the preferral of charges or the
imposition of restraint,
whichever date is earliest.
R.C.M. 707(a).
Charges must be referred within
The Commission is required to
proceed expeditiously,
“preventing any unnecessary
interference or delay.” 
§ 6(B)(2). 
Failure to meet a specified
deadline does not create a right
The presiding officer would be
responsible for ensuring an
expeditious trial.
Proposed 10 U.S.C. § 935a(d).
Procedural rules are required to
provide for the right to a public
trial, “unless the appointing
Procedural rules would be
required to provide that the
proceeding and disposition be
expeditious. 
§ 6(a)(9).
Procedural rules are required to
provide a preliminary proceeding
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eight days of arrest or
confinement, unless it is not
practicable to do so.
10 U.S.C. § 835.
The right to a public trial applies
in courts-martial but is not
absolute. 
R.C.M. 806.
The military trial judge may
exclude the public from portions
of a proceeding for the purpose
of protecting classified
information if the prosecution
demonstrates an overriding need
to do so and the closure is no
broader than necessary.




The rules do not prohibit
detention without charge, or
require charges to be brought
within a specific time period.
Proceedings “should be open to
the maximum extent possible,”
but the Appointing Authority has
broad discretion to close
hearings, and may exclude the
public or accredited press  from
open proceedings. 
§ 6(B)(3).
authority or presiding officer
determines that a closed trial, or
any portion thereof, is necessary
to the national security of the
United States.”
Proposed 10 U.S.C. § 935a(i)(4).
within 30 days of detention.
§ 6(a)(18).
Rules must also provide that the
trial be open and public,
including public availability of
the transcripts of the trial and the
pronouncement of judgment,
consistent with the need to
protect participants and the need
to protect sensitive government
information, the publication of
which is certified to pose a risk
of identifiable harm to the
prosecution of military
objectives; significant,
identifiable harm to intelligence
sources or methods; or
substantial risk that such
evidence could be used for
planning future terrorist attacks.
§ 6(a)(16); § 6(c-d).
Burden & Members of court martial must Commission members may vote Procedural rules must provide Procedural rules must provide
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be instructed that the burden of
proof to establish guilt is upon
the government and that any
reasonable doubt must be
resolved in favor of the
defendant. 
R.C.M. 920(e).
for a  finding of guilty only if
convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt, based on evidence
admitted at trial, that the accused
is guilty.
 §§ 5(C); 6(F).
The burden of proof of guilt is
on the prosecution, § 5(C);
however, M.C.I. No. 2 states that
element of wrongfulness of an
offense is to be inferred absent
evidence to the contrary.
M.C.I. No. 2 § 4(B).
that “the burden of proof shall be
upon the prosecution to prove
each element of an offense
beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Proposed 10 U.S.C. § 935a(i)(2).
that the accused be “presumed
innocent until proven guilty,”
and “not be found guilty except
upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.”
§ 6(a)(14).
Under the rules, the tribunal
would be required to apply
“reasonable rules of evidence
designed to ensure admission
only of reliable information or





No person subject to the UCMJ
may compel any person to
answer incriminating questions. 
10 U.S.C. § 831(a). 
Defendant may not be compelled
to give testimony that is
immaterial or potentially
degrading.  
10 U.S.C. § 831(c).
No adverse inference is to be
drawn from a defendant’s refusal
The accused is not required to
testify, and the commission may
draw no adverse inference from
a refusal to testify. 
§ 5(F).  
However, there is no rule against
the use of coerced statements as
evidence. 
There is no specific provision for
immunity of witnesses to prevent
their testimony from being used
Procedural rules must provide
that the accused may not be
compelled to testify or present
evidence against himself, that no
adverse inference will be drawn
against him for declining to
testify.
Proposed 10 U.S.C. § 935a(i)(5-
7).
Presumably, art. 31 UCMJ
would also apply, insofar as it
Procedural rules must provide
that the accused “not be
compelled to confess guilt or
testify against himself.”
§ 6(a)(15).
There is no express requirement
for a rule prohibiting adverse
inferences against an accused for
not testifying. Presumably, art.
31 UCMJ would also apply,
insofar as it prohibits service
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to answer any questions or testify
at court-martial.  
Mil. R. Evid. 301(f).
Witnesses may not be compelled
to give testimony that may be
incriminating unless granted
immunity for that testimony by a
general court-martial convening
authority, as authorized by the
Attorney General, if required.18
U.S.C. § 6002; R.C.M. 704.
against them in any subsequent
legal proceeding, however, under
18 U.S.C. §§ 6001 et seq., a
witness required by a military
tribunal to give incriminating
testimony is immune from
prosecution in any criminal case,
other than for perjury, giving
false statements, or otherwise
failing to comply with the order.
18 U.S.C. §§6002; 6004.
prohibits service members from
compelling testimony, but not as
to its exclusionary rule.
10 U.S.C. § 831.
Immunity for witnesses would
presumably be provided for in 18
U.S.C. §§ 6001 et seq.
members from compelling
testimony, but not as to its
exclusionary rule.
10 U.S.C. § 831.
Immunity for witnesses would
presumably be provided for in 18







Hearsay rules apply as in federal
court. 
Mil. R. Evid. 801 et seq.  
A duly authenticated deposition,
or video or audio-taped
testimony, may be used in lieu of
a live witness only if the witness
is beyond 100 miles from the
place or trial, the witness is
unavailable due to death, health
reasons, military necessity,
nonamenability to process, or
other reasonable cause, or the
whereabouts of the witness is
Defense Counsel may cross-
examine the Prosecution’s
witnesses who appear before the
Commission. 
 § 5(I).  
However, the Commission may
also permit witnesses to testify
by telephone or other means not
requiring the presence of the




In the case of closed proceedings
Procedural rules are required to
provide the accused the right to
present evidence and to
cross-examine each witness and
to have access to all evidence
that trial counsel intends to offer
at trial.
Proposed 10 U.S.C. § 935a(i)(9-
11).
There is no express provision for
the use of evidence where a
witness is unavailable (hearsay),
however, UCMJ art. 49
expressly applies to military
Procedural rules are required to
provide the accused access to all
of the evidence supporting each
alleged offense be given to the
accused, unless such information
is certified by the head of the
appropriate agency to pose a risk
of identifiable harm to the
prosecution of military
objectives; significant,
identifiable harm to intelligence
sources or methods; or
substantial risk that such
evidence could be used for
CRS-45
General Courts-Martial Military Commission OrderNo. 1 (M.C.O.) 




Procedures Act of 2005
H.R. 3038
unknown.
In capital cases, sworn
depositions may not be used in
lieu of witness, unless court-
martial is treated as non-capital
or it is introduced by the defense.
10 U.S.C. § 849.
The military judge may allow the
government to use a summary of
classified information, unless the
use of the classified information
itself is necessary to afford the
accused a fair trial.
Mil. R. Evid. 505.
or classified evidence, only the
detailed defense counsel may be
permitted to participate. Hearsay
evidence is admissible as long as
the Commission determines it
would have probative value to a
reasonable person.  
§ 6(D)(1). 
The Commission may consider
testimony from prior trials as
well as sworn and unsworn
written statements, apparently
without regard to the availability
of the declarant, in apparent
contradiction with 10 U.S.C.
§ 849.
§ 6(D)(3).
commissions as it does for
general courts-martial.
10 U.S.C. § 849.
There is no provision for
preventing access to classified
evidence to be used against the
accused, although the accused




planning future terrorist attacks.
§ 6(a)(4); § 6(b-c).
Rules must also provide the
accused the opportunity to
respond to the evidence
supporting each alleged offense;
to obtain exculpatory evidence
from the prosecution; and to
present exculpatory evidence.
§ 6(a)(7).
Rules must further provide the
accused the opportunity to
confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses and to offer
witnesses.
§ 6(a)(8).
There is no express provision for
the use of evidence where a
witness is unavailable (hearsay),
but such evidence might qualify
as admissible under the
“reasonable rules of evidence
designed to ensure admission
only of reliable information or
material with probative value.”
CRS-46
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have the right to compel
appearance of witnesses
necessary to their defense. 
R.C.M. 703.
Process to compel witnesses in
court-martial cases is to be
similar to the process used in
federal courts.
10 U.S.C. § 846.
The accused may obtain
witnesses and documents “to the
extent necessary and reasonably
available as determined by the
Presiding Officer.”  
§ 5(H). 
The Commission has the power
to summon witnesses as
requested by the Defense. 
§ 6(A)(5).  
The power to issue subpoenas is
exercised by the Chief
Prosecutor; the Chief Defense
Counsel has no such authority. 
M.C.I. Nos. 3-4.
Procedural rules are required to
provide the accused the equal




The authority of military
commissions to subpoena
witnesses not subject to the
UCMJ is not clearly stated in the
UCMJ, but those witnesses who
are “duly subpeonaed” and
refuse to appear or testified are
subject to trial in federal court.
10 U.S.C. § 847.
Rules must provide the accused
the opportunity to offer
witnesses, but it is unclear
whether there is any authority to





A qualified military judge is
detailed to preside over the court-
martial.  The convening authority
may not prepare or review any
report concerning the
performance or effectiveness of
the military judge.
The Presiding Officer is
appointed directly by the
Appointing Authority, which
decides all interlocutory issues. 
There do not appear to be any
special procedural safeguards to
ensure impartiality, but
Not expressly provided.  Article
37, UCMJ, prohibits any
unlawful attempt by a person
subject to the UCMJ to coerce or
influence the action of any
military tribunal.
10 U.S.C. § 837.
Procedural rules must require
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10 U.S.C. § 826.
Article 37, UCMJ, prohibits
unlawful influence of courts-
martial through admonishment,
censure, or reprimand of its
members by the convening
authority or commanding officer,
or any unlawful attempt by a
person subject to the UCMJ to
coerce or influence the action of
a court-martial or convening
authority.
10 U.S.C. § 837. 
Military defendants have the
opportunity to challenge the
military judge for cause.
10 U.S.C. § 41.
challenges for cause have been
permitted.
§ 4(A)(4).
The presiding judge, who
decides issues of admissibility of
evidence, also votes as part of
the commission on the finding of
guilt or innocence.
Article 37, UCMJ, provides that
no person subject to the UCMJ
“may attempt to coerce or, by
any unauthorized means,
influence the action of a
court-martial or any other
military tribunal or any member
thereof, in reaching the findings
or sentence in any case, or the
action of any convening,
approving, or reviewing
authority with respect to his
judicial acts.”
10 U.S.C. § 837. 
M.C.I. No. 9 clarifies that Art.
37 applies with respect to
members of the review panel. 
CRS-48
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A military accused has no Sixth
Amendment right to a trial by
petit jury.
 Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39-
40 (1942) (dicta).
 However, “Congress has
provided for trial by members at
a court-martial.” 
United States v. Witham, 47 MJ
297, 301 (1997); 10 U.S.C.
§ 825.
The Sixth Amendment
requirement that the jury be
impartial applies to court-martial
members and covers not only the
selection of individual jurors, but
also their conduct during the trial
proceedings and the subsequent
deliberations.
United States v. Lambert, 55 M.J.
293 (2001).
Military defendants have the
opportunity to exercise
peremptory challenge and
Military tribunals probably do
not require a jury trial.
See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,
39-40 (1942) (dicta).
 The commission members are
appointed directly by the
Appointing Authority. While the
Commission is bound to proceed
impartially, there do not appear
to be any special procedural
safeguards designed to ensure
their impartiality.  However,
defendants have successfully
challenged members for cause.
§ 6(B).
Military commissions are to
have three to seven
commissioned officers to serve
as members, but safeguards
concerning their impartiality are
not expressly addressed.
Proposed 10 U.S.C. § 935a(c).
Procedural rules must require
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challenge panel members for
cause.
10 U.S.C. § 41.
The military judge does not take
part in the deliberations of the
panel, and cannot preside over
cases in which he has taken part
in any investigation or acted as
accuser or counsel. 
10 U.S.C. § 26.
The absence of a right to trial by
jury precludes criminal trial of
civilians by court-martial.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
(1957); Kinsella v. United States







The appropriate Court of
Criminal Appeals automatically
reviews all convictions that result
in sentences of sufficient
severity, unless the defendant
waives such review. 10 U.S.C.
§ 622 The defendant may seek
discretionary review by the Court
There is no stated right to appeal
outside the Defense Department. 
A review panel appointed by the
Secretary of Defense reviews the
record of the trial in a closed
conference, disregarding any
procedural variances that would
not materially affect the outcome
A person found guilty by
military commission and
sentence to death or
imprisonment for more than five
years would have a right to a
review of that finding and
sentence, with respect to issues
of law, by the CAAF, and may
The procedural rules must, “at a
minimum, allow for review of
the proceedings of the tribunals,
and the convictions and
sentences of such tribunals, by
the [CAAF].” The Supreme
Court would have jurisdiction to
grant certiorari in such cases.  
CRS-50
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of Appeals for the Armed Forces
(CAAF), 10 U.S.C. § 867, and,
upon losing an appeal on the
merits at the CAAF, may seek
review from the Supreme Court
on a writ of certiorari.
28 U.S.C. § 1259.
The writ of habeas corpus
provides the primary means by
which those sentenced by
military court, having exhausted
military appeals, can challenge a
conviction or sentence in a
civilian court.  The scope of
matters that a court will address
is more narrow than in challenges
of federal or state convictions.
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137
(1953).
of the trial, and recommends its
disposition to the Secretary of
Defense.  Although the Defense
Counsel has the duty of
representing the interests of the
accused during any review
process, the review panel need
not consider written submissions
from the Defense, nor does there
appear to be an opportunity to
rebut the submissions of the
prosecution.  If the majority of
the review panel forms a
“definite and firm conviction
that a material error of law
occurred,” it may return the case
to the Appointing Authority  for
further proceedings.  
§ 6(H)(4). 
The review panel
recommendation does not appear
to be binding.  The Secretary of
Defense may serve as
Appointing Authority and as the
final reviewing authority, as
designated by the President.  
The individual is not privileged
to seek any remedy in any U.S.
appeal an adverse ruling there to
the Supreme Court on a writ of
certiorari.
Proposed 10 U.S.C. § 935a(k).
§ 6(e)(2-3).
The bill would not explicitly
alter the jurisdiction of the
CAAF.
10 U.S.C. § 867.
The procedural rules must
provide that the right to habeas
corpus may not be infringed.
§ 6(e)(19).
CRS-51
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court or state court, the court of
any foreign nation, or any
international tribunal.
M.O. § 7(b).
However, the writ of habeas
corpus will likely be available  





Death may only be adjudged for
certain crimes where the
defendant is found guilty by
unanimous vote of court-martial
members present at the time of
the vote.  Prior to arraignment,
the trial counsel must give the
defense written notice of
aggravating factors the
prosecution intends to prove.
R.C.M. 1004.
A conviction of spying during
time of war under article 106,
UCMJ, carries a mandatory death
penalty.
10 U.S.C. § 906.
Cruel and unusual punishment,
including flogging, or branding
or otherwise branding the body is
The accused is permitted to
make a statement during
sentencing procedures.
§ 5(M). 
The death sentence may  be
imposed only on the  unanimous
vote of a seven-member panel. 
§ 6(F).  
The commission may only
impose a sentence that is
appropriate to the offense for
which there was a finding of
guilty, including death,
imprisonment, fine or restitution,
or “other such lawful
punishment or condition of
punishment as the commission
shall determine to be proper.” 
§ 6(G).  
Three quarters of members
present for deliberation must
concur in order to issue a finding
of guilty, except in the case the
death penalty, in which case the
concurrence of all seven
members present is required.
Proposed 10 U.S.C. § 935a(c).
The death sentence would be
available only if the accused has
been found guilty of spying or an
offense causing the death of one
or more persons, where such
offense was committed after the
accused attained the age of
eighteen years. A sentence of
death would require approval by
the President.
Proposed 10 U.S.C. § 935a(h).
The UCMJ requirements for the
imposition of the death penalty
apply in any case in which a
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prohibited against persons
subject to the UCMJ.
10 U.S.C. § 855.
The convicted person may appeal
a sentence, and the sentence may
be mitigated or commuted, but
not increased, by the judge
advocate reviewing the case.
10 U.S.C. §§ 864, 866, 867.
If the Secretary of Defense has
the authority to conduct the final
review of a conviction and
sentence, he may mitigate,
commute, defer, or suspend, but
not increase, the sentence. 
However, he may disapprove the
findings and return them for
further action by the military
commission.
§ 6(H).
Source: Congressional Research Service
